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 2 Ultimate sampling dilemma 
Abstract 
Computer simulations and two experiments are reported to delineate the ultimate 
sampling dilemma, which constitutes a serious obstacle to inductive inferences in a 
probabilistic world. Participants were asked to take the role of a manager who is to make 
purchasing decisions based on positive versus negative feedback about three providers in two 
different product domains. When information sampling (from a computerized data base) was 
over, they had to make inferences about actual differences in the data base from which the 
sample was drawn (e.g., about the actual superiority of different providers, or about the most 
likely origins of negatively valenced products). The ultimate sampling dilemma consists in a 
forced choice between two search strategies that both have their advantages and their 
drawbacks: natural sampling and deliberate sampling of information relevant to the inference 
task. Both strategies leave the sample unbiased for specific inferences but create errors or 
biases for other inferences.  
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The Ultimate Sampling Dilemma in Experience-Based Decision Making 
 Many everyday decision problems rely on direct environmental-learning experience. 
Teachers’ grading decisions are informed by observations of students' performance in 
different disciplines. Personnel selection relies on applicants’ reactions to various tasks and 
interview topics. Or, consumer choices reflect the information acquired about brands or 
providers in different product domains. There appears to be a simple and straightforward way 
of optimizing such experience-based decisions: If only the learning process relies on a 
sufficiently large sample of observations, it must be possible to discern the optimal decision 
through optimal data selection (Oaksford & Chater, 2003).  
The learning task seems to have a clear-cut structure. For a consumer to make an 
optimal choice between alternative providers, it is only necessary to compare the quality 
feedback that is available for different providers in specific product domains. Granting that 
the feedback is reliable and accurately reflects the contingency between providers and product 
quality, figuring out the best provider, with the highest rate of positive evaluations, should be 
straightforward. The consumer’s task should be easy to solve if only the differences between 
providers are strong enough and sufficient observations are available. 
The aim of the present investigation is to contest this seemingly plausible sketch of 
simple experience-based decision making. In fact, finding a generally correct solution to such 
clearly structured problems is fraught with huge difficulties. It is actually impossible, because 
every sample of observations about mundane decision problems entails the potential to be 
misleading under certain conditions. I refer to the “ultimate sampling dilemma” to highlight 
the fact that any reasonable sampling strategy, which serves to optimize one decision, 
produces a sampling bias with regard to other decisions informed by the same data.  
Illustration of the Ultimate Sampling Dilemma 
That judgments and decisions depend crucially on the samples of relevant information 
that happen to be available is not new. Sampling error and sampling bias are have long been 
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recognized as prominent topics in the methodology of the social sciences (Macrae, 1970), in 
epidemiology (Schlesselman, 1982), in econometrics (Manski, 1995), and in recent cognitive 
research in particular (Denrell, 2005; Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; Juslin, Winman & 
Hansson, in press). The so-called sampling approach has inspired a growing number of 
experiments demonstrating that although judgments and decisions are often remarkably 
sensitive to the data given in a stimulus sample, they may nevertheless be inaccurate and 
severely flawed due to biases inherent in the stimulus samples provided by the environment. 
The present research builds on the sampling approach. However, it goes beyond previous 
studies by showing that sampling errors and biases are even more fundamental than suggested 
before. They not only result from "nasty environments" (Hogarth, 2001) that obscure the real 
world or do not allow decision makers to access relevant data. Rather, the ultimate sampling 
dilemma emerges even in completely "benevolent environments" that render all information 
available and do not mislead or constrain decision makers in their information search process.  
To illustrate this task setting, take the perspective of a manager, or entrepreneur, 
supposed to represent an "expert consumer", as it were, who is accuracy-motivated and got 
access to relevant data bases. The manager's task is to purchase electronic equipment of two 
kinds, computer technology and telephone devices. There are three providers offering 
hardware in both product domains. Let us assume all previous customers’ positive (+) or 
negative (–) experience with all computers (C) and telephones (T) from all three providers, P1, 
P2, P3, are available in a large database, from which the manager can draw a sample of any 
size. On each trial, information search can be, but need not be, constrained in any dimension. 
Thus, the decision maker may ask for an observation about a particular provider P1, or leave 
the selection of the next observation of any provider up to a random process. Or he/she may 
ask for an observation from product domain C and leave providers and evaluative outcome 
open.  Or he/she may ask for an example of a negative observation (–) about provider P1, or 
about a positive aspect (+) of Provider P3 observed in domain (T). Or, last not least, he/she 
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may leave all three aspects unspecified and just ask for the next randomly drawn observation 
from the entire database.  
Let us assume that the true environmental distribution in the database of positive and 
negative entries referring to the three providers in the two product domains is the one given in 
the upper chart of Figure 1 (Ecology A) – let us call it the “skewed world”. This database 
contains twice as many positive as negative entries for all three providers and for both product 
domains. With regard to domains, the ratio of C to T entries is also 2:1 and, with regard to 
providers, the ratio of entries on P1, P2, and P3, respectively, is 4:2:1. Although the 
distribution is skewed in all three dimensions, all contingencies are zero; the 2:1 ratio of + to 
– entries remains constant across all providers and product domains. Would a manager who 
can gather as many data as desired, using any strategy, figure out these true parameters of the 
environment? Or would the manager come up with a biased picture of the world?  
Natural sampling. The answer depends crucially on whether the decision maker restricts 
information search consistently to a strategy that has been called natural sampling (Gigerenzer 
& Hoffrage, 1995). Natural sampling means to draw random events from the entire database, 
without ever restricting the baserates of providers, product domains, and evaluative outcomes. 
In other words, natural sampling means to refrain from all directed information search. If 
decision makers apply natural sampling all the time, the expected three-dimensional 
distribution in the sample will indeed conserve the properties of the universe (as in Figure 1). 
However, the price for such representative, unbiased, natural sampling is that information 
search cannot be tailored to the task at hand. When the baserate of observations about the 
provider of main interest, or the product domain of main interest, is very rare, focusing on that 
specific provider and product domain is not allowed, nor is it possible to concentrate 
selectively on positive (+) and negative (–) events if required in a certain problem context. 
Whenever the strategy deviates from natural sampling and concentrates on specific aspects 
more than others, to pursue a specific hypothesis or task goal, the resulting sample will not 
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conserve the properties of the universe. The information resulting from selective sampling can 
only be trusted for the restrictive purpose for which it was selected (e.g., a specific provider in 
a specific domain). Using such a purpose-constrained sample for other purposes will often 
lead to seriously distorted and inaccurate decisions.  
Selective sampling. To anticipate an important result, hardly any decision maker 
engages systematically in natural sampling, observing passively and giving away the chance 
to focus actively on specific providers, product domains, and outcomes. This divergence from 
natural sampling inevitably produces sampling biases. For example, consider what happens 
when the consumer faces the problem of diagnosing the origin of deficient products but 
deficient products are very rare. Very likely, information search will focus on the rare 
negative outcomes. Such a selective sampling scheme will change the valence baserate, 
turning 2/3 positive (and 1/3 negative) entries in the universe into, say, 1/3 positive (and 2/3 
negative) entries in the sample. Such oversampling of rare events will not distort the kind of 
diagnostic judgments that were the purpose of selective search. That is, judgments of the 
origins of negative outcomes, like judging of p(provider P1 / –) or p(domain C / –), will be 
unbiased, just as odds ratios such as p(P1 / –) / p(P2 / –) will be unbiased. However, as a 
consequence of valence-bound sampling, all sample-based judgments that use valence as the 
dependent variable, such as estimates of p(+ / P1) or p(+ / P1 in domain C) or p(–), will be 
biased. Depending on the proportion of trials on which search has been constrained by 
valence, the sample proportions of + and – outcomes reflect the decision maker’s own 
selective search focus. As a general rule, to the extent that any variable constrains the 
sampling of information, the subsequent estimation of that variable is no longer unbiased. To 
that extent, the distribution of this variable reflects the decision maker’s search strategy rather 
than the true environmental parameter.  
Why then do people not refrain from conditional information search? Why do they not 
exploit the advantage of natural sampling? An apparent answer is because disadvantages of 
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natural sampling may outweigh its advantages. First of all, natural sampling can be very 
expensive. If one is interested in a rare cell of a natural design (e.g., in deficits (–) of provider 
P3 in domain T; cf. Figure 1), natural sampling would require one to collect a huge number of 
observations until a sufficient information for the focal cell is attained. This pragmatic 
problem is further exacerbated when more complex designs include, for instance, the 
Cartesian product of valence (maybe more than 2 levels) x providers (maybe more than 3), x 
product domains (maybe more than 2) x recency of information (old vs. recent feedback) x 
prize level (high, medium, low) x validity of information source x further variables. The 
number of design cells can easily increase to an insurmountable number. Information about 
the rarest cells would be hardly accessible through natural sampling. If the decision problem 
(e.g., analyzing deficits of P3 in product domain T) calls for data from particular cells, a 
selective sampling strategy may be necessary and adaptive, such as positive testing (Klayman 
& Ha, 1987; Oaksford & Chater, 1994), which means to actively search for those events that 
are in the focus of the task or hypothesis, however rare they are in the universe. 
Unequal sample size, or impoverished evidence from rare cells, is but one problem of 
natural sampling. Another, equally severe problem lies in human learning, which is of course 
dependent on a sufficiently large sample of learning trials. Even when observation time were 
unrestricted and inexpensive, very rare events are likely to evade learning and memory, due to 
inhibition from more frequent neighboring events. There is ample evidence that when the 
same trend is observed in two categories (e.g., the same positivity ratio for P1 and P3) but the 
number of observations is different (i.e., P1 and P3 differing by the ratio 4:1), then the trend 
(i.e., the preponderance of positive evaluation) will be more readily learned for the larger 
category P1 than for P3, due to less inhibition and more extensive learning experience for the 
former (see Fiedler, 1996; 2000; Fiedler & Walther, 2003). Thus, even when after a long 
period of natural sampling from rare event classes the resulting sample is sufficiently large, 
learning and memory may still be impaired.  
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At a more fundamental level, even the very possibility of truly natural, unconditional 
sampling may be questioned. In reality, unlike the ideal world of statistics text books, 
information search is inevitably conditional on the decision maker's position in time and 
space, and his or her psychological distance from the decision target (Fiedler, in press). A  
consumer will be hardly able to sample information about all products, providers, markets, 
and product attributes non-selectively. Rather, some products or markets will be closer and 
others will be more remote; advertising structures render products and brands differentially 
available; positive evaluations of products are clearly more available in the information 
ecology than negative evaluations; and consumers' sampling is mostly confined to the present 
time and to one's own country or regional market as opposed to the past and remote places. 
For these and many other reasons, literally unconstrained sampling is pragmatically 
impossible. What makes the situation even worse is that the consumer normally has no 
knowledge whatsoever about the sampling constraints imposed on newspapers, TV-
advertising, or the Internet. Thus, when encountering the positivity rates of providers or 
product domains in the media, or when assessing the relative proportion of deficient products 
associated with a particular provider, the consumer does not know if and to what extent the 
media have been sampling naturally, and by what factor the observed rates have been 
selectively over-sampled or under-sampled. Therefore, even when given a free choice, real 
decision makers can hardly realize the ideal of natural sampling.  
Conversely, one may ask why decision makers do not abandon natural sampling and 
rely on selective samples tailored to the decision problem at hand. For instance, if the problem 
context calls for consumer judgments of the proportion p(+ / P1 vs. P2, P3) of positive 
evaluations (+) of provider P1 in comparison to other providers, P2, P3, then one is on save 
ground when one samples an equal number of observations about all three providers in order 
to compare their positivity proportions. These proportions will be unbiased regardless of the 
provider baserates in the population. To repeat, sample-based judgments are unbiased as long 
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as the dependent variable of the judgment task (proportion of  + valence) has not been used 
for selective sampling. Biases and distortions will only result when judging a variable on 
which sampling was contingent (e.g., when attributing positive or negative product 
evaluations to P1 vs. P2, P3, based on a sample that greatly over-represents the baserate of P1. 
Having understood this simple rule, the consumer might avoid all biases and shortcomings 
just by tailoring the sampling process to the judgment problem at hand and by not misusing 
samples drawn for one purpose for another purpose.  
Simple and straightforward as this solution might appear, it is hardly feasible for several 
reasons. First, consumers (like organisms in general) normally do not know the constraints 
imposed by nature on the observations to which they are exposed in reality. When hearing 
someone tell a bad story about a specific car, or when reading a comparative article about 
cars, or when drawing on his or her own memory for car experiences, one hardly ever knows 
to what extent the underlying sampling process was constrained. Second, even if it were 
known exceptionally, the constraints may change with each and every new observation. And 
third, the maxim to utilize for every judgment only those samples that were drawn with the 
independent variable in mind, and to fully ignore samples that were drawn with the dependent 
variable in mind, implies an untenable model of knowledge representation. The consumer 
would have to hold simultaneously many different representations of the same relation 
between providers, product domains, and valence – one for each sampling strategy that has 
been used (or imposed externally) for the collection of data. Some introspection and some 
logical reflection tells us that knowledge is not organized this way by sampling strategies and 
that it would be impossible to administrate such a multiply split, uneconomical memory. In 
general, for each k-tuple of variables (e.g., the triple of valence, providers, and domains), 
knowledge would have to be separately stored for each sampling strategy that is conceivable. 
Therefore, tailoring the sampling process to the specific judgment purpose is only possible in 
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exceptional cases, in which decision makers do not rely on prior knowledge but have 
unrestricted control over the sampling process and access to the entire universe.  
Impact of Particular Sampling Schemes 
Thus, the ultimate sampling dilemma is like sailing between skylla and charybdis. 
Natural sampling is potentially unbiased but very expensive, insensitive to rare events, and in 
reality often not feasible. Selective sampling is more feasible, especially when focusing on 
rare events or pursuing specific hypotheses, but the resulting sampling biases will very likely 
carry over to judgments of variables that somehow contributed to information search. Facing 
this dilemma, one has to admit that real-world decisions are likely to rely on information that 
entails sampling biases. Let us now elaborate on the nature of these sampling biases and their 
consequences for the decision process. So what will a manager do when facing the task 
depicted above? Granting that he or she will not refrain from active information search, what 
alternative search strategies might be used?  
Output-bound sampling. One typical strategy is to make information search contingent 
on certain outcomes. An individual motivated by the goal to avoid regret and not to make 
mistakes could mainly look at negative outcomes, biasing the information sample toward 
negative outcomes. All sample-based estimates of valence (either unconditional or conditional 
on specific levels of the other variables) will then tend to be too negative. If there are indeed 
differences between providers, sampling of an equal proportion (or any other constant ratio) 
of positive and negative events will obscure these differences. Lacking a priori knowledge of 
the true outcome proportion, the decision maker never knows what proportion to sample. 
One might correct for the bias, in principle, if one has meta-cognitive insight into the 
sampling bias. However, as will soon be apparent, such meta-cognitive monitoring and 
control of sampling bias will be hardly successful. Decision makers will normally take the 
sample evidence at face value and base their judgments and decisions directly on the 
corresponding sample statistics (Juslin et al., in press; Kareev, Arnon & Horwitz-Zeliger, 
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2002). If the sample proportion of positive outcomes is downward biased due to selective 
attention to negative outcomes [say, if the sample proportion p*(+ / P1 & C) = 1/3 = .33, 
whereas the invisible proportion in the universe is p(+ / P1 & C) = 2/3 = .67], estimates will 
follow the visible sample proportion (Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch & Wild, 2000; Juslin, 
Winman, & Hansson, in press; Kareev & Fiedler, 2006), with little attempt to correct for bias.  
Thus, output-bound search by valence will lead to biases in judgments that use valence 
as a dependent variable, such as judgments of p(+ / P1 & C). However, while backward 
judgments using valence as an independent variable, like estimates of p(P1 & C / –) or p(P1 & 
C / +), should be unbiased, they may be distorted for different reasons. For instance, when 
judging, in the context of a liability affair, the likelihood with which different providers are 
responsible for deficits, the most prevalent provider P1 and the most prevalent domain C will 
bear the strongest association with negative events. Had the task focus been on diagnosing 
origins of positive outcomes, in contrast, P1 and C might have been most strongly associated 
with positive information. However, note that the latter judgment effect would reflect biases 
in associative memory rather than sampling biases proper.  
Input-bound sampling. As the valence of outcomes can be considered the logical 
dependent variable of the problem, an "experimental sampling strategy" consists in assessing 
valence as a function of providers and domains, sampling an equal number of observations 
from all 3 x 2 cells of the design. Although an experimental design is commonly considered 
optimal, it is not bias-free at all (Brunswik, 1955; Dhami, Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2004; 
Hoffrage & Hertwig, 2006). On one hand, when information search leaves valence open and 
constrains providers and domains to be orthogonal, then the resulting estimates of valence 
(conditional or unconditional) are indeed unbiased. On the other hand, however, when the 
need arises to estimate the likelihood that a certain provider or domain caused a negative 
outcome, then all differences between providers and domains have been blurred through the 
"experimental" scheme.  
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There are other insights prevented by experimental sampling. Consider, for example, the 
environment in the bottom chart of Figure 1, which represents a case of Simpson’s paradox. 
On one hand, pooling across product domains, it is true that the positivity rate is higher for P3 
than P2 than P1. On the other hand, when product domains are taken into account, it turns out 
that the positivity rate is markedly higher in domain C than T and that the seeming advantage 
of P3 is merely due to P3's mostly providing products from the superior domain, C. As the 
mediating impact of domains is partialled out, comparing providers separately within both 
domains, then P3 is no longer dominant. Such a spurious correlation, or mediational effects 
(Baron & Kenney, 1986) go undetected if the correlation between providers and domains is 
eliminated in an orthogonal design (Fiedler, 2000).  
Mixed strategies. In reality, information search is characterized by mixed strategies, 
anticipating the need to estimate different aspects of the same decision problems. Decision 
makers sometimes exhibit natural sampling, sometimes fix only the provider, only the product 
domain, or only the evaluative outcome, and on still other trials they consider specific cells of 
the design. Seemingly, such a mixture should result in a flexible representation of the decision 
problem from all vantage points. In fact, however, the resulting sample is so complexly 
contaminated with bias that it is practically impossible to reconstruct the original environment 
from the sample. This is especially so when sampling is not under the decision maker's own 
control but imposed by an information ecology that does not reveal its sampling constraints. 
The ultimate sampling dilemma can thus be formulated as follows. When all 
information pertaining to a decision problem is freely available and the decision maker is 
motivated to solve the problem rationally, he/she faces a dilemma between two sampling 
schemes, either to refrain from all active information search and to rely on natural sampling or 
to engage in deliberate information search, enjoying its advantages but obscuring the original 
environmental distribution. The former strategy will conserve the true data structure, but the 
costs and time required to collect any, let alone reliable information about rare events can be 
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immense, and memory will be biased toward more frequent event combinations. The latter 
strategy can be tailored to fit the focus of the task at hand, but the resulting information 
sample will distort other judgments for which the sample was not tailored. Any mixture of 
these two opposite extremes will result in an incalculable combination of both problems.  
Metacognitive Myopia 
Assuming complete rationality, to be sure, one might correct for any biases inherent in 
the sample. Estimates of any measure would have to be corrected downward or upward 
dependent on the degree to which it has been over-sampled or under-sampled, respectively, 
using Bayesian statistics. However, the computational work required for such a Bayesian 
correction would exceed human capacity for most real problems, and the necessary statistics 
(baserates, likelihood ratios, conditional dependencies) are hardly ever known. For instance, 
to re-compute the original proportion p(+ / P1) from an observed sample proportion p*(+ / P1) 
of positive evaluations of provider P1, one would have to know, for each individual 
observation, on what combination of factors (providers x domains x valence) it was restricted. 
Separately for each combination of sampling constraints, the degree of over- or under-
sampling would have to be calculated, and the correction algorithm would have to be a 
weighted average of all correction factors computed for each combination of sampling 
constraints. It goes without saying that such a monstrous task is unlikely to be mastered; it is 
virtually impossible to be solved because in reality we seldom know the sampling constraints 
including all conditional dependencies for every single observation.  
It may be for this reason that decision makers have evolved what might be called meta-
cognitive myopia (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler, Freytag & Unkelbach, in press; Fiedler & Wänke, 
2004; Juslin, Winman & Olsson, 2000; Kareev et a., 2002; Winman & Juslin, 2006). Thus it 
appears as if even highly motivated judges do not care about the origin and the history of the 
sample data on which they base their judgments. They are often remarkably accurate relative 
to sample itself. But they are short-sighted, if not blind, regarding the way in which a stimulus 
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sample was generated. They take the sample statistics for granted, accurately but naively, as if 
were an unbiased snapshot of the underlying reality (cf. Fiedler et al., 2000; Juslin et al., in 
press; Kareev et al., 2002; Winman & Juslin, 2006).  
Plan of the Present Research 
In the remainder of this article, I elaborate on the interplay between inevitable sampling 
effects and meta-cognitive myopia. I first present a simulation study that illustrates the 
strength and scope of the biases resulting from different sampling strategies. Then, another 
section will be devoted to experimental evidence about the way human decision makers deal 
with the ultimate sampling dilemma. Both simulations and experiments will keep within the 
same task setting that was used in the introduction – buying computers and telephone 
equipment offered by three providers based on stored positive and negative feedback – within 
the ecology depicted in Figure 1. 
Biases Resulting from Different Sampling Strategies: A Simulation Study 
Methods and Design 
To provide a systematic analysis, a simulation study was conducted. Sampling biases 
were studied as a function of sampling strategies, with reference to two types of judgment 
tasks. One task calls for inferences of the conditional probabilities of positive outcome given 
different combinations of providers and domains, p(+/P1,C), p(+/P2,C), …, p(+/P3,T), 
allowing for relative evaluations of providers and domains. Let these inferences be called 
causal or forward inferences, because providers and domains can be conceived as causing 
evaluations. The second task calls for diagnostic or backward inferences, based on reverse 
conditional probabilities p(P1/–),  p(P2/–), …, p(C/+), … p(P3,T/–). Here, the resepctive 
sample statistics are used to diagnose the origin (in P1, P2, P3 x C,T) of + or – outcomes.  
In accordance with Figure 1 (upper chart), a data base included 480 positive instances 
(+) about provider P1 in domain C; 240 instances of +, P2, C; 120 instances of +, P3, C and so 
forth. Each simulated sample consisted of n = 100 instances, drawn randomly within the 
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constraints imposed by the different strategies. Two sets of indicators (for causal and 
diagnostic inferences) were calculated for each sample.  
The manipulation of sampling strategies was based on the following assumptions. 
Decision makers should be completely free, on each information-search trial, to engage in 
natural sampling or to restrict the information search in one, two, or in all three dimensions. 
Thus, the decision maker may just ask for the next piece of evidence, leaving open whether 
the valence is + or –, whether the provider is P1, P2, or P3, and whether the domain is C or T. 
On such a natural-sampling trial, the computer will randomly draw one item from the whole 
population, with each item in the universe having the same probability of being drawn. 
Alternatively, she might want to see an observation about P1, leaving open domain and 
valence, or ask for a + item from the C domain, or a – item about P3 in the T domain, or 
solicit any other combination of {+, – , open} x { P1, P2, P3,open} x {C, T, open}. The 
computer makes a random draw from the restricted subset of all items in the population (e.g., 
from all +, P1 items when + and P1 are asked for).  
The simulation involves different combinations of restrictions in all three dimensions. 
Altogether, the study uses a 7 (restrictions on providers) x 7(restrictions on domains) x 7 
(restrictions on valence) design. The seven restriction levels on providers are: 
(1) Unrestricted on all 100 trials (natural sampling) 
(2) 40 unrestricted, 30P1, 15P2, 15P3  
(3) 40 unrestricted, 20P1, 20P2, 20P3 
(4) 40 unrestricted, 15P1, 15P2, 30P3 
(5) 0 unrestricted, 50P1, 25P2, 25P3 
(6) 0 unrestricted, 33P1, 34P2, 33P3 
(7) 0 unrestricted, 25P1, 25P2, 50P3 
Thus, across the seven levels, the proportion of unrestricted, natural sampling decreases 
from 100 (level 1) to 40 (level 2-4) to 0 (level 5-7), and within these three blocks, the 
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enforced proportions of items drawn for the three providers change. Likewise, for the 
dichotomous domains and valence factors, respectively, the seven constraint levels are: 
(1) 100 unrestricted  
(2) 40 unrestricted, 45C, 15T for domains; 40, 45+, 15–, for valence 
(3) 40 unrestricted, 30C, 30T for domains; 40, 30+, 30– for valence  
(4) 40 unrestricted, 15C, 45T for domains; 40, 15+, 45– for valence 
(5) 0 unrestricted, 75C, 25T for domains; 0, 75+, 25– for valence 
(6) 0 unrestricted, 50C, 50T for domains; 0, 50+, 50– for valence 
(7) 0 unrestricted, 25C, 75T for domains; 0, 25+, 75– for valence 
Altogether, then, we simulated all 7 x 7 x 7 = 343 strategies, or combinations of 
constraint levels, running 100 replications per strategy and calculating two sets of indicators 
for each 100-item sample, corresponding to both types of judgment task: 
p(+ / provider, domain): forward inferences of the likelihood of positive valence given 
all combinations of 3 providers and domains; and  
p(provider, domain / –): backward inferences of the origins, in all combinations of 
providers and domains, of negative outcomes. 
Results and Discussion 
Recall that the population distribution is skewed in all three dimensions (cf. Figure 1): 
more P1 than P2, than P3 data, more C than T data, and more + than – data. However, all 
pairwise correlations are zero; the ratio of + to – is the same (2:1) for all levels of providers 
and domains, just as the ratio of C to T is constant (2:1) across providers and valence, and the 
provider proportions are invariant across domains and valence. Thus, in reality, the correct 
value of forward inferences, p(+ / providers, domain) is always 0.67 (see Table 1). Similarly, 
the correct backward inferences to the three providers, both from positive and negative 
valence, in both domains (see Table 2), are always 0.57, 0.29, 0.14 (reflecting the 4:2:1 ratio). 
The correct backward inference to domains C and T, given any provider or valence, is always 
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0.67 versus 0.33 (reflecting the 2:1 ratio). Deviations from these normative values in the top 
row of Tables 1 and 2 indicate sampling errors or biases.  
Natural sampling. Consider first the simulation results for a purely natural sampling 
strategy (i.e., unrestricted sampling in all three dimensions on all 100 trials). As tables 1 and 2 
reveal, the average sample estimates resulting from this strategy are quite accurate for all 
forward and backward judgment tasks. Unrestricted sampling from a population yields 
unbiased estimates – an elementary statistics lesson. However, the drawback of this seemingly 
ideal strategy lies in the paucity of information obtained about the more infrequent event 
combinations. The mean number of observations sampled for the four rarest event 
combinations is less than 4; for eight event classes the mean number is less than 7.  
Output-bound sampling. The next block in Tables 1 and 2 shows the impact of output-
bound sampling. To the extent that decision makers themselves determine the proportion of + 
versus – outcomes, not surprisingly, forward inferences of p(+/providers, domains) are biased 
toward the self-determined valence rates. For example, when search is unrestricted regarding 
providers and domains, but the rate of + outcomes (across all 100 trials) is set in advance to 
be high (i.e., 75+, 25–), medium (50,50), or low (25,75), the sample estimates of p(+ / 
providers, domains) reflect exactly these predetermined values (cf. Table 1).  
For another search strategy, decision makers might leave valence unrestricted on 40 
trials and restrict the valence of the outcome only on the remaining 60 trials (e.g., gathering 
75% negative outcomes when the aim is to diagnose origins of deficits). As evident from the 
next block in Table 1, the result of the mixture of natural and constrained output sampling 
resembles the completely restricted sampling, for obvious reasons. Mixing up 40% natural 
sampling (i.e., 67% +) with 60% trials that impose only 25% + (and 75% –) yields an overall 
positivity rate of only about 42% (Table 1), well below the original population value of 67%.  
Thus, output-bound sampling, even when only applied to a subset of trials, leads to 
systematic biases in forward inference tasks. As expected, to the extent that sampling is 
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restricted (e.g., partially predetermined) in one dimension, inferences concerning that 
dimension from the other dimensions are biased. Inferences in the other direction (i.e., from 
the restricted dimension to other dimensions) may be unbiased, provided the search strategy 
leaves the dimension to be inferred unrestricted. Thus, backward inferences from restricted 
valence to providers and domains closely resemble the correct rates (cf. Table 2).  
Input-bound sampling. By the same token, input-bound search (i.e., total or partial 
restrictions imposed on the proportions of providers or domains) leads to biases in backward 
inferences, just as output-bound search obscures forward inferences. For example, over-
sampling P3 cases and under-sampling P1 cases leads to inflated backward inferences of the 
likelihood that P3 rather than P1 was the origin of a negative (or else, a positive) outcome.  
Selective input-output sampling. Note that all sampling strategies considered here 
merely impose constraints on baserates, rather than selective attempts to induce expected or 
desired contingencies. It goes without saying that a strategy that looks for many + outcomes 
in domain C but mostly looks at – outcomes in domain T will result in an illusory contingency 
between domains and valence. Although such motivated, self-deceptive sampling may not be 
uncommon in reality, I exclude these blatant cases from consideration.  
Summary. Thus, simulations confirm that, by definition, natural sampling is principally 
unbiased but may not be feasible for different reasons, due to the paucity of infrequent event 
classes and the impossibility to focus selectively on the most interesting event classes. As this 
major disadvantage of natural sampling is avoided through active information search, the 
resulting samples are biased in those dimensions that have governed the information search 
process. Selective focusing on positive or negative outcomes (i.e., output-bound sampling), 
while informing unbiased backward estimates p(provider, domain / –), causes biases in 
forward evaluative judgments of p(+ / provider, domain). Selective focusing on particular 
providers and domains (i.e., input-bound sampling) yields unbiased forward judgments p(+ / 
provider, domain) but biased backward judgments of p(provider, domain / –). Mixed 
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strategies that result from input-bound sampling on some trials and output-bound sampling or 
multiply constrained sampling on other trials lead to biases in both forward and backward 
inferences (see bottom blocks in Tables 1 and 2). Such mixed samples render the 
reconstruction of the original population characteristics almost impossible.  
Experimental Investigation of the Ultimate Sampling Dilemma 
The simulation presented so far merely corroborates what can be seen from the algebraic 
notation alone, but it nevertheless helped to recognize the direction and strength of the biases 
and to understand some of its boundary conditions. Let us now go one step further and 
investigate the sampling dilemma experimentally, using human participants rather than 
computer algorithms. It can be expected that when presented with the same task as the 
simulation program, human decision makers will exhibit the same sampling problems. They 
might engage in purely natural sampling, never constraining their search on any dimension or 
focussing on specific problem aspects. Assuming such a strategy, the samples informing their 
decisions would be unbiased. However, such undirected search would be very uneconomic; 
extremely large samples would be needed to fill the most infrequent cells with a reasonable 
number of observations. Memory capacity would be overwhelmed and motivation would be 
exhausted. Therefore, rather than using natural sampling, decision makers can be expected to 
actively focus on task-relevant information. However, the price for such focussed search is 
that the resulting samples can only be trusted for some judgments but not for others. Only 
estimates of those variables that have not influenced the sampling process will be unbiased. 
Several previous studies have documented judgment biases that reflect hard-to-control 
sampling biases imposed by intransparent environments (Fiedler, Brinkmann & Betsch, 2000; 
Fiedler, Walther, Freytag & Plessner, 2002; Juslin et al., in press). However, prior studies did 
not tackle the impact of sampling biases in situations in which information search is 
completely transparent and fully under the judges' control. Particularly, no prior research has 
addressed the ultimate sampling dilemma, that is, the trade-off between natural sampling and 
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selective, focussed sampling strategies. How often will participants spontaneously engage in 
natural sampling under ideal conditions, and how often will they actively constrain their 
sample? If they constrain information search, will they do it consistently or change their 
strategy from trial to trial, producing complexly mixed samples that are multiply biased?  
Empirical answers were sought in two experiments. In Experiment 1, information search 
was fully controlled by the participants. Different search strategies were solicited, though, 
through manipulations of the task focus, or hypothesis to be tested. In Experiment 2, natural 
sampling was enforced. Both experiments together provide empirical evidence on how people 
try to handle the ultimate sampling dilemma.  
Predictions. The main predictions derive from the analysis of the ultimate sampling 
dilemma and from the simulation results. Regarding Experiment 1, it was expected that 
consistent natural sampling should be very rare. Instead, participants should tune their 
information search to the task focus, taking into account that (some of their) judgments reflect 
severe sampling biases. Moreover, due to meta-cognitive myopia (cf. Fiedler et al., 2000; 
Fiedler & Wänke, 2004), judges should readily rely on the same samples for forward and 
backward judgments, regardless of whether sampling had been contingent on the independent 
variables (provider, domain) or the dependent variable (valence) of the judgment problem. 
Consequently, output-bound sampling (i.e., obscuring the valence baserates) should result in 
biased forward judgments of p(+/providers, domains). Similarly, input-bound sampling (i.e., 
constraining information search to specific providers or domains) should produce biases in 
backward diagnoses of negative outcomes, that is, in ratings of p(provider, domains / –). 
Mixed-sampling constraints (i.e., obscuring the baserates of two or more variables) should 
produce biases in either direction. When natural sampling is enforced in Experiment 2, the 
typical biases resulting from selective sampling should be eliminated, but new problems 
should arise. Sampling errors and regression effects (Fiedler, 1996; Furby, 1973) should 
render judgments about the least frequent design combinations extremely inaccurate.  
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Experiment 1 
Participants were asked to take the role of a leading manager whose task is to purchase 
hardware equipment for an organization. The cover story said there are three providers, 
MediaCom, EMG, and Hi-Tech (in the following denoted P1, P2, P3, respectively), offering 
products in two domains, computers and telecommunication, and that former customers’ 
positive and negative experiences were stored in an exhaustive electronic data base. 
Participants were free to gather as many observations from the data base as they considered 
appropriate. The task focus was manipulated to induce forward inferences versus (diagnostic) 
backward inferences. Either forward comparative evaluations of the positivity of providers, 
p(+ / Providers, Domains), or backward diagnostic judgments of the origins of negative 
outcomes, p(Providers / –), were called for. Another manipulation, provider focus, pertained 
to a specific provider that had to be compared with the others. The focal provider was either 
P1 (most frequent provider, see Figure 1) or P3 (rarest provider).  
The first prediction, to repeat, was that natural sampling should be rare. Most 
participants should resort to selective sampling, producing some mix of input-bound and 
output-bound sampling. Second, a task focus on positive evaluation, p(+ / Providers, 
Domains), should induce predominantly input-bound sampling (by providers and domains) 
and, if output-bound search occurs, the focus should be on positive outcomes. In contrast, a 
task focus on diagnosing deficits, p(Providers, Domains / –) should encourage output-bound 
samples biased toward negative outcomes and, in case of input-bound sampling, enhanced 
interest in the focal provider. And third, depending on the degree of input-bound and output-
bound sampling – which can vary between task focus conditions and between individual 
judges – biases should carry over to backward and to forward judgments, respectively. More 
positive forward judgments are predicted when output-bound sampling concentrates on 
positive outcomes, encouraged by a task focus on p(+ / Providers, Domains), rather than 
negative outcomes, given a focus on p(Providers / –). The strength of these biases should 
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correlate across judges with the strength of sampling biases. Backward (diagnostic) judgments 
of the origins of negative outcomes, p(Providers / –), should tend to blame the most 
frequently encountered provider, P1, unless input-bound sampling focuses on another 
provider. Whether this occurs should depend, finally, on the provider-focus manipulation. A 
focus on P1 as the provider of main interest should increase the skew of the data base, 
strengthening the association between P1 and the other prevalent aspects in the sample. A 
focus on P1 should strengthen attribution of negative outcomes to P1 in backward diagnostic 
judgments. A P1 focus may also strengthen the learned association of P1 and positive 
outcomes in forward evaluations. These tendencies should be attenuated or reversed when the 
focus is on P3, so that the major role played by P1 is obscured in the sample.  
Method 
Participants and Design. Fifty-six male and female students of the University of 
Heidelberg participated either for course credit or for payment. They were randomly assigned 
to one of four groups representing all combinations of provider focus (on P1 vs. P3) and task 
focus (positive evaluation vs. diagnosing deficits). 
Materials and Procedure. Participants arrived alone or in groups of two to six. They 
were seated in front of separate computers that administered instructions, stimulus 
presentation, and dependent measures. Instructions consisted of the cover story – to play the 
role of a manager whose task is to find out the best provider for purchasing computers or 
telephone hardware, based on former customers’ positive and negative reactions concerning 
all three providers in both product domains. Then, in the specific part of the instructions, two 
aspects were manipulated, task focus and provider focus, between four experimental groups: 
In the positive evaluation, P1 focus condition, judges were asked to make forward 
evaluative inferences of the positivity of provider P1 in comparison to other providers.  
In the positive evaluation, P3 focus condition, judges were asked to make forward 
evaluative inferences of the positivity of provider P3 in comparison to other providers.  
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In the diagnosing deficits, P1 focus condition, judges had to make backward inferences 
about causes of negative outcomes originating in P1 compared to other providers.  
In the diagnosing deficits, P3 focus condition, judges had to make backward inferences 
about causes of negative outcomes originating in P3 compared to other providers.  
The translated instructions in the Appendix show that participants were explicitly 
instructed to make inferences about the evaluation of providers in the whole database, or 
inferences about the origins of deficits in the database, as distinguished from the sample. It 
was then explained at length that participants could sample as many observations as they 
liked, from the database in which the reactions of former customers had been stored. They 
were completely free in their search strategy. On every trial they could either call for an item 
drawn at random from the data base (fully unconstrained) or an item about provider Px drawn 
at random from all Px entries in any domain or valence category, or any positive reaction from 
the computer domain, about any provider, or any other combination constrained in 0, 1, 2, or 
all 3 dimensions. A 2 x 3 x 2 cube was presented graphically on the screen, with the rows 
labelled “Computers” and “Telecommunication”, the columns labelled “MediaCom, EMG, 
Hi-Tech” and the foreground and background slice labelled “positive” and “negative”. Below 
the cube, the response keys that could be used to constrain sampling in any subset of the three 
dimensions were marked in three rows (i.e., the Y and U key in the upper row to select 
domain C or T; the G, H, J keys in the middle row to select provider P1, P2, or P3, 
respectively; and the B and N keys to call for a + or – outcome). They could fix any value on 
any dimension, or leave a dimension open. The graphical display supported the instructions 
such that when a certain value on a dimension was fixed, the other values disappeared (e.g., 
when domain C was chosen, only the upper row of the cube remained; when P1 was chosen, 
the other columns were removed from the display etc.).  
After the participant had indicated his or her constraints, the computer randomly 
selected one out of all items in the database that met the constraints chosen. Altogether the 
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database was defined by the same population distribution as in the simulation above (Figure 
1). If the item drawn was positive, the computer selected a positive comment from a pool of 
240, such as “If one needs maintenance, somebody is immediately available.” If it was 
negative, the comment was selected from a pool of negative ones, like “If one needs 
maintenance, nobody is available.” This item was then presented for three seconds on the 
screen, inserted in the cube position that corresponded to the domain, the provider, and the 
valence. Participants knew that they could terminate information search at any time, by 
pressing the Escape key.  
Dependent measures. The main dependent measures were percentage inferences from 
the samples observations to the data base. Participants were reminded of the distinction 
between the sample they had drawn and the overall database, and they were then asked to 
infer the percentage of positive entries in the database concerning each provider: “What is 
your estimate of the proportion of positive information entries in the entire database (across 
product domains) for the provider MediaCom / EMG/ Hi-Tech, among over all information 
stored about this provider?" In addition to these forward inferences, they were then asked to 
make backward inferences of the proportion of deficits that were due to each provider: "Now 
consider exclusively negative information. Please estimate what percentage of all negative 
information in the entire database originates in the provider MediaCom / EMG / Hi-Tech." 
(The same backward inferences were also solicited for the origins of positive outcomes, with 
similar results, not reported here).  
Finally, at the end of the session, the three-dimensional cube appeared again on the 
screen, just as during stimulus presentation, and judges were asked to estimate (in cardinal 
frequencies) how many observations they had sampled from each cell of the 2 x 3 x 2 scheme. 
Although possibly by the preceding inferences, these sample estimates were included if only 
to ensure that judges were aware of the distinction between the sample and the population. 
Results and Discussion 
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Basic sample data. Consider first some basic descriptive data about the samples drawn 
in the present task situation. The average size of the self-determined samples across all 
conditions was 51.29. As Table 3 shows, sample size was somewhat larger when the focus 
was on the rare provider P3 rather than P1, reflecting the need to sample longer where 
environmental supply for the focal provider was low.  
As expected, natural sampling occurred very rarely. The proportion of trials on which 
the average participant engaged in unconstrained search was 0.11 across all conditions, 
ranging between 0.08 and 0.19 under specific instructions (cf. Table 3). No differences 
between conditions were significant (all Fs < 2). Only one participant engaged in natural 
sampling consistently, across all trials, another one on 98% of the trials. All other participants 
chose natural sampling on less than 50% of their trials.  
Instead, virtually everybody constrained information search in one or more dimensions 
on a large part of all trials. The average prevalence of trials constraining search to a specific 
domain was .66 across all conditions, .81 for (forward) positive evaluation as compared to .51 
for (backward) diagnosing deficits. The corresponding task-focus main effect was significant, 
F(1,52) = 13.75, p = .001. Similarly, the proportion of trials on which one specific provider 
was fixed was higher for a positive evaluation (.74), which is a forward task, than for the 
backward task, diagnosing deficits (.53), F(1,52) = 5.66, p = .05 (overall average = .63). 
Together, these two findings provide a successful manipulation check. Apparently, forward-
evaluation instructions induced more experimental strategies (i.e., search conditionalized on 
the independent variables, domains and providers) than backward-diagnosing instructions. 
Whereas the tendency to conditionalize search on providers and domains (i.e., input-
bound sampling) is reminiscent of experimental strategies, the strong output-bound sampling 
tendency to call for either + or – outcomes is more surprising. On average, the proportion of 
trials on which participants restricted the outcome (to + or –) was .718 across all conditions. 
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Curiously, output-bound search (cf. Table 3) was most elevated in the forward-evaluation / P1 
focus condition (.83), but the differences between experimental groups were not significant.  
Unfortunately, due to a mistake in the computer program, when sampling was 
contingent on a provider, the specific provider chosen was not registered. This precluded a 
systematic analysis of provider baserates in the sample beyond the correctly assessed fact that 
provider was rarely left unspecified (i.e., only in .40 of the trials).  
Sampling biases. Given that natural sampling occurred so rarely and that almost all 
samples were restricted in one or more dimensions, we can next examine whether the 
resulting samples were biased systematically, that is, whether the rates of specific domains, 
providers, and evaluations in the samples deviated from the original baserates in the 
population. Recall that the population distribution was skewed in all three dimensions (i.e., 
2:1 baserate ratios for domains and valence, and the 4:2:1 ratio for providers). This original 
skew was clearly reduced in the samples acquired, reflecting regression toward more equal 
baserates (Table 3). The proportion of observations drawn from the more frequent C domain 
was .577, due to input-bound sampling, as compared with an original baserate of .667. 
Likewise, the proportion of positive items decreased from .667 in the population to .495 in the 
sample, due to output-bound sampling.  
Estimates of sample frequencies. The data registration failure for the providers chosen 
precludes an analogous check for this dimension, but the subjective estimates of sample 
frequencies afford a substitute here. As evident from Table 4, estimates of the observed 
frequencies of the 12 event combinations were clearly regressive; that is, actually existing 
frequency differences were underestimated. However, it is also apparent that the average 
participant correctly found out the ordinal differences between domains, providers, and 
valence levels, and that the focus manipulations exerted the intended influence. Thus, when 
the focus was on P1 rather than P3, the higher prevalence of P1 data was more apparent.  And, 
the high prevalence of positivity was more evident when the task focus was on evaluating 
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positivity than on diagnosing deficits. All these differences proved significant in a domains x 
providers x task focus x provider focus ANOVA that is not reported here to save space. 
More importantly, the sample-frequency estimates allow for a first check on the major 
phenomena encountered in the simulation study, pertaining to biases in forward evaluations 
due to output-bound sampling and biases in backward diagnoses due to input-bound 
sampling. Because judges varied in the degree to which they solicited positive data, the 
consequences of output-bound sampling is evident in a significant correlation (r = .413, p < 
.01) between the individual proportion p*(+ / .) of positive items sampled, across all domains 
and providers, and the estimated positivity proportion (i.e., the sum of all six positive 
frequency estimates, divided by the sum of all twelve estimates). With regard to input-bound 
sampling, which could only be examined for domains, the proportions of items chosen from 
the C domain was similarly correlated (r = .404, p < .01) with the pooled estimated frequency 
proportion of C items in the sample.  
Judgment biases. Of most interest is the question whether biases in the samples actually 
led to errors and biases in the eventual population inferences. Let us first consider forward 
inferences of the positivity of the three providers, p(+/ P1, P2, P3), as assessed in three direct 
ratings. Recall that output-bound sampling of positive outcomes and, consequently, positively 
biased population inferences, were predicted when the task focus was on positive rather than 
negative information. Table 5 provides the pertinent means as a function of focus conditions. 
Apparently, both predictions are clearly borne out. Positivity rates in the samples were higher 
for positive evaluation (.64 and .63, for P1 and P3 focus, respectively) than for diagnosing 
deficits (.41 and .30). Accordingly, the average rated percentages of positive information in 
the data base (across all other conditions), was higher under the former (M = 48.56) than the 
latter task focus (M = 38.10; cf. Table 5).  
For an appropriate statistical test, an ANOVA was conducted with task focus and 
provider focus as between-participants factors and a contrast between ratings P1 and average 
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ratings of P2 and P3. The predicted judgment bias was apparent in a task focus main effect, 
F(1,52) = 9.33, p < .01, reflecting more positive inferences when the task focussed on positive 
evaluation rather than diagnosing deficits. Regardless of this self-generated bias in the 
stimulus input, the sample was taken as observed in making population inferences, turning the 
sampling bias into a judgment bias. The provider focus x task focus interaction was also 
significant, F(1,51) = 15.11, p < .001, as the task focus effect was mainly due to judges who 
focused on provider P1. Due to the highest density of information associated with P1, this 
provider was most strongly associated with the predominant valence. 
< ### Correlation across Ss with output-sampling bias >  
As expected, the impact of input-bound sampling biases is also manifested in backward 
attributions of negative outcomes to provider P1, as compared with the other two providers, P2 
and P3. From the means in Table 5 it is evident that negative outcomes were generally 
attributed to P1, who was most frequent in the database, except for the backward P3 focus 
condition, in which P3 was associated with a focus on negative observations. The deviant 
result for this group was manifested in a three-way provider-contrast x task type x provider 
focus interaction, F(1,52) = 7.81, p < .01, as well as a two-way task type x provider focus 
interaction, F(1,52) = 12.09, p < .01. Altogether, these findings corroborate the assumption of 
sampling biases carrying over to analogous judgment biases, due to meta-cognitive myopia, 
that is, judges’ failure to control and correct for self-generated sampling biases. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, when search strategies were completely free, participants rarely chose 
natural sampling. They rather constrained information search to specific domains, providers, 
and valence levels. As a consequence, the resulting samples exhibited distinct biases, and the 
final judgments were biased accordingly. One might conjecture that the major problem 
merely lies in the failure to apply natural sampling. However, the ultimate sampling dilemma 
entails good reasons to suspect that natural sampling may also lead to inaccuracy.  
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A second experiment was therefore conducted, which replicated Experiment 1 in all 
respects, except that natural sampling was enforced. All participants were exposed to an 
unconstrained random sample of observations drawn from the same population as in 
Experiment 1. The predictions were straightforward. On aggregate, across all judges, the 
resulting sample should provide an unbiased picture of the universe. However, at the level of 
individual judges, samples should be impoverished with respect to rarest events, leading to 
inaccurate and highly regressive judgments. Moreover, as the degree of regression (i.e., the 
underestimation of positivity rate) should increase with decreasing sample size, judgment 
biases should come in through the backdoor, through differential regression. The same high 
degree of positivity should be judged to be lower for infrequent than for frequent providers.  
Methods 
Participants and Design. Thirty-nine male and female students of the University of 
Heidelberg participated. They were randomly assigned to the same four instruction conditions 
(resulting from orthogonal crossing of task focus and provider focus) as in Experiment 1. 
Because natural sampling is fully random, neither task focus nor provider focus could affect 
the sampling stage. However, the two treatments might still influence selective memory and 
attention to task aspects and providers during the final judgment stage. 
Materials and Procedure. The same computer program (including all instructions and 
dependent measures) was used as in Experiment 1, except for changes in the information 
search instructions and procedures. Rather than being allowed to actively search for 
information, participants observed a series of observations randomly drawn from the data 
base, without any restrictions. Stimuli appeared at a constant rate of 3 s per observation. 
Information search was terminated as the participant pressed the ESC key.  
Results and Discussion 
Basic sample data. The average participant sampled 35.21 observations (SD = 20.90). 
As expected, natural sampling led to impoverished data for the less frequent combinations of 
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product domains x providers x valence levels. Although the distribution of observations 
sampled across these 12 cells (pooling over participants) closely resembled the population 
distribution (cf. Table 6), the average individual sample included less than 2 observations in 
five out of the 12 cells. Even with doubled sample size, statistical inferences from these 
infrequent data would be extremely unreliable. This is also evident from the large number of 
judges (out of 39) basing their estimates on observed frequencies smaller than, or equal to, 0, 
1, or 2 (cf. Table 6). Only when the lability of individual samples is eliminated by pooling 
over judges does natural sampling result in an accurate picture of the population.  
Sample estimates. The major asset of natural sampling is apparent, by and large, in 
subjective estimates of the frequencies of the 12 domains x providers x valence combinations 
(Table 6). Thus, at an ordinal level, the average judge correctly reported that more positive (M 
= 14.83) than negative observations (M = 11.16) had been sampled, that there were more data 
for domain C (M = 14.03) than for domain T (M = 11.95), and that the frequency of sampled 
data decreased from P1 to P2 to P3 (M = 14.46, 13.68, 10.85, respectively). However, in spite 
of the average judges' conserving these ordinal differences, and the absence of a crude bias, 
frequency estimates were highly regressive, yielding ratios much smaller than the actual ratios 
of 2:1 or even 4:1; cf. Table 6). When frequency estimates were transformed into proportions 
to render them comparable to population proportions, large frequencies were clearly 
underestimated whereas small frequencies were overestimated.  
Note, however, that unsystematic regression error can turn into systematic bias when the 
strength and direction of regression effects varies across events. This is apparent from an 
analysis of inaccuracy scores, that is, from the signed differences between subjective 
estimates and objective proportions (cf. Table 6; all transformed into proportions). These 
inaccuracy scores, which tend to be negative for the more frequent levels on the domains, 
providers, and valence factors but positive for infrequent levels (reflecting regression), were 
subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA (including all 39 participants). Biases resulting 
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from differential regression were apparent in strong main effects on all three factors, 
reflecting selective underestimation (i.e., negative scores) for domain C, F(1,38) = 39.44, p < 
.001, for the most frequent provider P1, F(2, 76) = 53.76, p < .001, and for positive 
observations, F(1,38) = 18.35, p < .001. Similarly, the same basic regression tendency 
produced three two-way interactions. The tendency to underestimate positive and to 
overestimate negative observations increases from domain T to C, F(1,38) = 9.73, p < .01, 
from P3 to P2 to P1, F(2, 76) = 8.67, p < .001, and the inaccuracy difference between providers 
is more apparent for domain C than for T, F(2,76) = 19.42, p < .001. Thus, as different aspects 
were unequally affected by regression, the resulting subjective estimates were severely biased 
in all three dimensions as well as in their interactions. Such a differential pattern of over- and 
underestimation can be expected to be typical of natural sampling in skewed environments.   
Biased population inferences. Let us finally consider the crucial dependent measure, 
namely, the inferences about the population, as distinguished from the estimates of sample 
frequencies. It was expected that biased judgments should arise from extremely unequal cell 
frequencies, as the same trend (e.g., the same 2:1 ratio of positive to negative outcomes) 
should be more apparent for frequently observed than for rarely observed events. In particular, 
this implies that in forward evaluations of providers’ assets the prevalent positivity should be 
rated highest for the most frequent provider P1, intermediate for P2, and lowest for the least 
frequent provider P3. To capture this sort of bias, a weighted sum score was computed (cf. 
Table 7) by multiplying the positivity ratings of P1, P2, and P3 by coefficients +1, 0, and –1, 
respectively. The higher (i.e., the more positive) this score, the stronger the expected bias to 
overestimate P1 and to underestimate P3 in forward ratings of p(+/providers). For backward 
diagnostic inferences, an analogous weighted score of p(providers / –) reflects the tendency to 
attribute deficits to the frequent (P1) rather than infrequent (P3) source. It was further expected 
that infrequency effects might come to interact with the focus manipulations. Higher P1 than  
P3 judgments – both in terms of more positive forwards inferences and in terms of more 
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negative backward diagnoses – should be accentuated when an attention focus on P1 
reinforces the actually existing density differences. 
Consider first the forward inferences of p(+/providers). As expected, the composite 
scores tended to be positive (M = 14.05, t(21) = 2.87, p < .01) when the focus was on P1, but 
not when the provider focus was on P3, M = –2.82, t(16) = –.365). Thus, when the focus was 
consistent with the prevalence of providers, inferred positivity decreased from P1 to P2 to P3, 
although the actual positivity rate in the population was constant. With regard to backward 
inferences of p(providers/ –), the tendency to attribute negative information to frequent rather 
than infrequent providers reveals a similar bias to attribute deficits to the most prevalent 
provider, but only when the focus was on P1, M = 13.77, t(21) = 2.40, p < .05, rather than on 
P3, M = –9.88, t(16) = –1.33. (Ironically, though, + outcomes were also attributed to P1). 
When backward inferences were analyzed as a function of the two between-participants 
factors, task focus and provider focus (see Table 7), the bias score tended to be strongest 
when the provider focus was actually on P1 rather than on P3, yielding a significant provider 
focus main effect, F(1,35) = 6.61, p < .05. The forward-inference bias towards P1 was also 
most pronounced when the focus was on P1 rather than P3, although the provider focus main 
effect was not quite significant, F(1,35) = 3.04. All other effects were nil (F < 1).  
Altogether, the results of Experiment 2 reveal that although natural sampling produces 
(by definition) unbiased samples, the judgments run into new problems. Information about 
infrequent events is impoverished. Moreover, regression error can be very strong, and 
differential regression can produce a new class of biases that can distort the relative 
impression of frequent and infrequent sources.  
General Discussion 
On summary, the present inquiry into the ultimate sampling dilemma revealed what it 
had to reveal on a-priori grounds, namely, that there is hardly a real chance to evade this 
dilemma of the empirical world. To be sure, decision makers – or more generally, organisms 
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– may refrain from the possibility to actively search for information tailored to test specific 
hypotheses and passively resort to natural sampling. Ideally, this produces an unbiased 
sample, but one that is impoverished with regard to rare events. If decisions refer to such rare 
events (e.g., accidents, crimes etc.), then the information of interest may be missing or 
overshadowed by large amounts of unwanted or irrelevant information. Moreover, in reality, 
it is unclear whether natural sampling is possible at all. At any point in time or space, 
information about the different objects is not equally available. This restricts nature's ability to 
provide us with truly natural samples. Consider the Internet for a nice thought experiment. 
Whoever tried to search for specific objects in the Internet will agree how hard and actually 
impossible it is to solicit a natural, unrestricted sample that warrants “true” baserates. The 
resulting sample of Internet sites is always conditional on, and biased toward, the specific 
keywords used, the position of different sources in the hierarchy of search engines, the 
communicability of different contents, and the availability of Internet sites for particular 
topics. Literally, the Internet does not allow for natural sampling.  
A related question is whether absolute baserates exist at all – baserates that hold across 
time, space, cultures, markets, and decision contexts. To the extent that baserates change over 
time or between regions or cultures, the "true" population baserates are hard to determine. As 
a consequence, whether a supposedly natural sample really conserves the natural baserates 
cannot be controlled. 
Alternatively, rather than striving for natural sampling, organisms may follow the role 
model of a clever research designer and actively sample those events that are most relevant to 
the decision problem in front of them. The resulting samples, which are inevitably selective, 
can yield unbiased answers to the problems for which they were designed. But as new 
problems arise and the same sample is used to answer them, the responses can be seriously 
misled. Specifically, to the extent that decision makers have engaged in input-bound 
sampling, forward inferences are likely to be accurate but backward inferences are biased 
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toward those input levels that are over-represented in the sample. Conversely, to the extent 
that decision makers engage in output-bound sampling, their backward inferences are likely to 
be accurate, but forward inferences will be biased toward the outcome valence that is over-
represented in the sample. Finally, engaging in mixed sampling strategies will not ameliorate 
these problems but may even worsen the situation, causing biases in either direction. 
Given a sample that entails a complex mix of search strategies, Bayesian correction is 
not really viable. If each of, say, 100 observations about the same provider is conditional on a 
specific combination of search constraints, such as time, media, information source, set of 
providers considered, focus on valence, product domains, and so forth, and if most 
observations not even reveal their underlying constraints – how should the Bayesian 
correction of a biased sample be accomplished? For instance, how should even the best 
Bayesian statistician correct for a biased sample of resulting from an Internet search, if each 
entry in a list of entries has different constraints and, crucially, those constraints are not 
transparent at all?  
Computer simulations served to illustrate the ultimate sampling dilemma. Although the 
simulations did not demonstrate something that cannot be derived through analytical 
reflection alone, they served to illustrate the nature and the degree of the judgment biases 
arising from different search strategies. Two experiments provided an empirical test of the 
open empirical question of how human decision makers deal with the ultimate sampling 
dilemma. Experiment 1 corroborated our intuition that hardly anybody engages in a pure 
natural-sampling strategy when information search is fully unconstrained. Rather, people 
tended to sample information predominantly from those cells that were relevant to testing 
specific hypotheses. When the task focus was on the relative positivity of a specific provider, 
participants would gather mostly positive information about the provider under focus. 
Although focussing on a specific provider might have resulted in unbiased forward inferences 
of that provider’s positivity, a simultaneous (output-bound) focus on positive valence 
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rendered even forward judgments distorted. Conversely, when the focus was on the 
explanation of negative outcomes, output-bound sampling of negative events was facilitated. 
As a consequence, forward judgments were biased toward negative information. However, 
backward (diagnostic) inferences of the origins of negative outcomes were also biased to the 
extent that sampling was at the same time input-bound, concentrating on a provider of main 
interest. Thus, mixed and changing sampling strategies, rather than producing a balanced 
picture of reality, actually contaminated judgments in either direction. The judges’ uncritical 
reliance on the sample given reflected meta-cognitive myopia.  
Experiment 2, then, provided complementary findings for the same decision tasks when 
natural sampling was enforced. Although the resulting overall samples was indeed unbiased, 
information about infrequent event classes was insufficient. Sample-based judgments were 
nevertheless biased through differential regression. For instance, although positive outcomes 
were constantly frequent and negative outcomes constantly infrequent across all providers, 
this difference was more clearly recognized for the most frequent provider but often missed 
and underestimated for the rarest provider. Thus, the regressive tendency to underestimate 
real frequency differences, which characterizes all memory-based frequency estimates, was 
most apparent where samples were most impoverished, consistent with many previous 
demonstrations of differential regression in confirmation-bias studies (Fiedler, 1996; Fiedler 
et al., 2002; Fiedler & Walther, 2003; Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins & Miyake, 1995). In any 
case, natural sampling did not provide a useful remedy at all, because unreliability and 
regression biases came in through the back door. 
What insights and implications can be gained from this inquiry into the ultimate 
sampling bias? Is the inherent message really so pessimistic? – I believe that in fact the 
message is not that pessimistic, and that quite a few optimistic aspects, both theoretically and 
practically, deserve to be pointed out. On one hand, it is important to note that the ultimate 
sampling dilemma is not a deficit of the human mind, but a genuine property of empirical 
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reality. Non-human, artifical-intelligence systems would suffer from similar problems when 
fed with the same complexly biased input. In its most radical form, the ultimate sampling 
dilemma reflects the fact that “true” or normatively correct answers to many probabilistic 
problems actually do not exist. They are indeterminate, because there is no single reality 
behind the sample. There is no objectively correct sampling scheme to estimate the “true” 
probability that somebody will die from a car accident, or that an academic career will be 
successful, or that the stock market will show a decline during the next five years. Whatever 
sampling scheme is applied will be conditionalized on a search strategy that focusses on 
specific sources, time frames, geographical frames, media, and on the categories that are 
arbitrarily used to define the respective reference set. Whether these sampling constraints are 
representative of the population cannot be determined because the latent reality is invisible.  
On the other hand, much can be learned from the more refined part of the message, 
concerning the moderators of the sampling dilemma. Input-bound strategies in general, and 
experimental strategies in particular, will normally provide appropriate samples for forward 
(causal) inferences. Likewise, output-bound samples inform accurate backward (diagnostic) 
inferences. However, crucially, any given sample with a specific generation history does not 
warrant an unbiased, omni-directional perspective applicable to all decision problems. 
Inferences will be biased to the extent that the sampling process was contingent on the 
dependent variable to be inferred. This restriction has to be kept in mind when decisions are 
made in science, economy, and politics. Beyond the common practice to describe samples in 
terms of size and general quality or representativeness, it is essential to indicate the inherent 
directionality and conditionality. For instance, even a very large carefully selected clinical 
sample of, say, depressive patients (matched with the same number of appropriate controls), 
however representative it is, must not be used uncritically for ethiological (causal) inferences 
about the influence of genetic factors, learning, stress, or attribution on depression.  
 37 Ultimate sampling dilemma 
The last and maybe most serious point, though, refers to the one aspect of the dilemma 
for which the human mind is to blame to a reasonable degree, namely, the meta-cognitive 
myopia that often prevents people of all intelligence levels from recognizing the pitfalls of 
sampling biases. The present experiments corroborate the basic finding from many other 
sampling approaches that decision makers – whether lay people of experts – take sample 
information for granted, uncritically and naively, even when it is obvious that samples are 
severely biased (Fiedler et al., 2000; Kareev et al, 2002). Maybe one of the most prominent 
goals of research on rationality and intellectual emancipation is to sensitize decision makers 
to major sampling biases in the environment (Denrell, 2005; Taylor, 1991) – due to media 
coverage (Combs & Slovic, 1979), restricted information access (Fiedler, in press; Fiedler & 
Walther, 2003), selective memory (Tesser, 1978), unequal communicability (Kashima, 2000), 
or restricted designs (Wells & Windschitl, 1999) – to educate people in what samples are 
good for and to engage in corrections of biased samples wherever this is possible. In those 
remaining cases where corrections of biased samples are not available, the most prominent 
goal is to understand that ignoring a sample may be better, and more rational, than accurately 
utilizing a sample tailored for the wrong purpose. 
 38 Ultimate sampling dilemma 
Appendix 
General instructions provided at the beginning of the experimental session: 
“Dear participant: 
Thanks for your willingness to participate in this study. 
In this study, all information is transparent. That is, the goal and purpose of the study is 
not kept secret. You will not be distracted from the actual purpose and no deception will be 
involved. And we do not tray for a moment to manipulate or direct your behavior. 
Your task entails a role play – you are supposed to take the role of an entrepreneur who 
has to make purchasing decisions – but this is quite a natural task familiar to everybody. 
Before you buy something, you compare different providers with regard to advantages and 
disadvantages and you thereby rely on experiences that others have made with the same 
products and providers. Analogously, you will get access to a data base containing all stored 
experience with the offered products. This data base constitutes the reality; it is physically 
available on the computer and provides the graduator for your achievement. Making accurate 
judgments means to make judgments that correspond to the “reality” of the data base.  
If you could assess and memorize all available data, then your decisions would have to 
be correct. That is, there would actually be one best decision.  
Like in real life, however, it is not possible to take the entirety of all information into 
account. Sufficient time is often lacking, and it would be much too expensive and fully 
unusual to base each and every decision on the entirety of all relevant information. Besides, 
we would run into a storage problem. Our memory would suffer from overload just like the 
hard-disk of our computer, let alone the problem of how to derive a decision from the 
insurmountable quantity of information. We would soon miss the trees before the forest.  
Rather than assessing and utilizing everything – which in the era of the Internet is 
impossible anyway – we almost always base our decisions on a  s a m p l e  of information. If 
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the sample is not too small and not distorted selectively, this is usually no problem. Then the 
sample affords a rather reliable picture of the reality.  
Your task also consists in drawing a sample from the data base, enabling to you make a 
correct decision. Promised: the actual differences in the data base are strong enough so that a 
commonly chosen sample size allows you to detect these differences – provided the sample is 
drawn in a way appropriate to the problem. This is exactly the key to success: collecting data 
that are useful for the problem at hand in that they reveal the actual relations that hold in the 
data base.  
… You have to equip your company with electronic devices … Two electronic domains 
have to be distinguished, computers and telecommunication. That is, you have to purchase 
both computer for work stations as well as telephones, picture telephones, and cell phones for 
conferences. You have to compare three providers, who all offer products in both domains. 
Thus, the data base for this problem discriminates between: 
3 providers (EMG, MediaCom, Hi-Tech) 
2 product domains (computers and telecommunications) 
2 possible outcomes (positive or negative)”  
 
After an extended explanation of the multiple ways of constraining information search, 
and how to handle the keyboard, instructions were manipulated between focus conditions: 
Task focus = positive evaluation – Provider focus = P1 (called MediaCom)  
"You are to find out whether in the total data-base the provider MediaCom received 
better evaluations than the other two providers, pooling across product domains. That is, is the 
relative proportion of positive observations among all observations for MediaCom higher than 
for the other 2 poviders?" 
Task focus = positive evaluation – Provider focus = P3 (called XXxxx)  
"MediaCom" replaced by "XXxxx", otherwise identical.  
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Task focus = diagnosing deficits – Provider focus = P1 (called MediaCom)  
"You are to find out whether in the total data-base negative observations most frequently 
originate in the provider MediaCom. Only think of the set of negative outcomes. Does the 
provider MediaCom appear more frequently in this reference set than the other two providers, 
regardless of the positive information?" 
Task focus = diagnosing deficits – Provider focus = P3 (called XXxxx)  
"MediaCom" replaced by "XXxxx", otherwise identical.  
 
The general instructions preceding the dependent measures read as follows:  
"Now, as indicated at the outset, you will be asked to draw inferences from what you 
have seen to the total data base. The judgments you are supposed to make below are always 
meant as judgments about the entire data base from which you have gathered observations."  
 
Finally, the sample estimates of the frequencies of all 12 event combinations were 
solicited: 
"And finally, now, a few more questions about the actually observed information. Now 
your task is not to make inferences concerning the entire database, but to estimate the  a b s o 
l u t e  frequencies of positive and negative observations you have seen for the different 
providers in both product domains. How many examples (not %) did you see for the 
following combinations …?" 
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Table 1: Simulation of forward (causal) inferences 
Domain 
C,T 
Provider 
P1, P2, P3 
Valence 
+,– 
 
p(+/C,P1) 
 
p(+/C,P2) 
 
p(+/C,P3) 
 
p(+/T,P1) 
 
p(+/T,P2) 
 
p(+/T,P3) 
Correct Population Values 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Natural sampling 
- - - 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.65 
Output-Bound Sampling 
- - 
45,15 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.72 
- - 
30,30 0.56 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.61 
- - 
15,45 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.46 
- - 
75,25 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.74 
- - 
50,50 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 
- - 
25,75 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24 
Input-Bound Sampling 
- 
50,25,25 
- 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
- 
33,34,33 
- 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.70 
- 
25,25,55 
- 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.67 
75,25 - - 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.66 
50,50 - - 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.66 
25,75 - - 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Joint Constraints 
50,50 33,34,33 50,50 0.50 0.39 0.50 0.57 0.56 0.46 
- 33,34,33 50,50 0.43 0.53 0.54 0.42 0.53 0.56 
50,50 - 50,50 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.38 0.37 0.39 
50,50 33,34,33 - 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.66 
25,75 25,25,50 25,75 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.33 0.19 0.34 
25,75 25,25,50 75,25 0.86 1.00 0.60 0.56 0.82 0.83 
- 50,25,25 75,25 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.76 
- 50,25,25 25,75 0.18 0.36 0.28 0.19 0.36 0.27 
- 25,25,50 75,25 0.71 0.61 0.83 0.74 0.58 0.85 
- 25,25,50 25,75 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.28 
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Table 2: Simulation of backward (diagnostic) inferences  
Domain 
C,T 
Provider 
P1, P2, P3 
Valence 
+,– 
 
p(C,P1/–) 
 
p(C,P2/–) 
  
p(C,P3/–) 
 
p(T,P1/–)  
 
p(T,P2/–)  
 
p(T,P3/–) 
Correct Population Values 0.39 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.05 
Natural sampling 
- - - 0.38 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.05 
Output-Bound Sampling 
- - 
45,15 0.37 0.20 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.05 
- - 
30,30 0.38 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.09 0.04 
- - 
15,45 0.38 0.18 0.09 0.20 0.10 0.04 
- - 
75,25 0.38 0.19 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.05 
- - 
50,50 0.39 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.05 
- - 
25,75 0.39 0.20 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.05 
Input-Bound Sampling 
- 
50,25,25 
- 0.38 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.05 
- 
33,34,33 
- 0.34 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.07 
- 
25,25,55 
- 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.11 
75,25 - - 0.30 0.13 0.07 0.28 0.14 0.08 
50,50 - - 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.42 0.22 0.11 
25,75 - - 0.38 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.05 
Joint Constraints 
50,50 33,34,33 50,50 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.14 
- 33,34,33 50,50 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.10 
50,50 - 50,50 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.35 0.18 0.09 
50,50 33,34,33 - 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.14 
25,75 25,25,50 25,75 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.33 
25,75 25,25,50 75,25 0.04 0.00 0.24 0.32 0.16 0.24 
- 50,25,25 75,25 0.35 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.08 
- 50,25,25 25,75 0.36 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.07 0.08 
- 25,25,50 75,25 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.09 0.14 0.10 
- 25,25,50 25,75 0.17 0.18 0.32 0.08 0.09 0.16 
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Table 3: Characteristics of spontaneously gathered samples 
Task Focus: 
Provider Focus: 
Forward 
P1 Focus 
 
Forward 
P3 Focus 
 
Backward 
P1 Focus 
 
Backward 
P31 Focus 
 
 
Overall 
 
Mean Sample Size 
(SD)  
 
 
52.00 
(33.76) 
 
62.71 
(41.65) 
 
33.86 
(27.24) 
 
56.57 
(38.75) 
 
51.29 
(36.43) 
 
Natural Sampling 
Proportion of Trials 
 
 
.06 
 
.10 
 
.19 
 
.08 
 
.11 
 
p(Domain unspecified) 
p(Domain specified) 
p(C called for) 
p(T called for) 
 
p(C in sample) 
 
 
.18 
.82 
.45 
.37 
 
.576 
 
 
.20 
.80 
.43 
.37 
 
.559 
 
.49 
.51 
.25 
.26 
 
.566 
 
.49 
.51 
.28 
.23 
 
.607 
 
.34 
.66 
.35 
.31 
 
.577 
 
p(Provider unspecified) 
p(Provider specified) 
 
 
.26 
.74 
 
.27 
.73 
 
.51 
.49 
 
.55 
.45 
 
.40 
.60 
 
p(Valence unspecified) 
p(Valence specified) 
p(+ called for) 
p(– called for) 
 
p(+ in sample)  
 
 
.17 
.83 
.51 
.32 
 
.64 
 
.44 
.56 
.33 
.23 
 
.63 
 
.28 
.72 
.24 
.48 
 
.41 
 
.24 
.76 
.15 
.61 
 
.30 
 
.28 
.72 
.31 
.41 
 
.495 
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Table 4. Mean Estimates of Joint Sample Frequencies By Conditions in Experiment 1 
  
Computers 
 
 
Telecommunication 
 P1 
 
P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 
 + 
 
–  + –  + –  + –  + –  + –  
 
Population 
 
 
.254 
 
.127 
 
.127 
 
.063 
 
.063 
 
.032 
 
.127 
 
.063 
 
.063 
 
.032 
 
.032 
 
.016  
 
Forward P1 Focus  
 
 
.127 
 
.097 
 
.077 
 
.070 
 
.087 
 
.072 
 
.097 
 
.062 
 
.094 
 
.067 
 
.091 
 
.058 
 
Forward P3 Focus  
 
 
.119 
 
.060 
 
.094 
 
.074 
 
.100 
 
.069 
 
.098 
 
.062 
 
.108 
 
.057 
 
.105 
 
.055 
 
Backward P1 Focus 
 
 
.059 
 
.173 
 
.068 
 
.119 
 
.061 
 
.074 
 
.060 
 
.112 
 
.063 
 
.098 
 
.056 
 
.058 
 
Backward P3 Focus 
 
 
.094 
 
.088 
 
.061 
 
.101 
 
.095 
 
.123 
 
.078 
 
.067 
 
.064 
 
.071 
 
.071 
 
.087 
 
Total 
 
 
.100 
 
.105 
 
.075 
 
.091 
 
.085 
 
.085 
 
.083 
 
.076 
 
.082 
 
.073 
 
.081 
 
.06 
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Table 5. Mean Population Inferences (in Percent) By Conditions in Experiment 1 
  
Forward Inferences 
p(+ / Providers) 
 
 
Backward Inferences 
p(Providers / –) 
 P1 
 
P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 
 
Objective 
Percentage 
  
66.67 
  
66.67  
 
66.67 
 
57.14  
 
 
28.57 
 
 
14.29 
 
 
Forward P1 Focus  
 
 
54.14 
 
 
37.71 
 
 
40.86 
 
 
40.43 
 
 
30.86 
 
 
35.14 
 
 
Forward P3 Focus  
 
 
53.71 
 
51.57 
 
53.36 
 
 
40.93 
 
 
36.29 
 
39.86 
 
Backward P1 Focus 
 
 
35.71 
 
40.64 
 
41.50 
 
44.71 
 
32.00 
 
26.71 
 
Backward P3 Focus 
 
 
39.64 
 
36.07 
 
35.00 
 
24.81 
 
33.88 
 
40.24 
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 Table 6. Mean Estimates of Joint Sample Frequencies By Conditions in Experiment 2 
  
Computers 
 
 
Telecommunication 
 P1 
 
P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 
 + 
 
–  + –  + –  + –  + –  + –  
 
Population 
proportion 
 
 
.254 
 
.127 
 
.127 
 
.063 
 
.063 
 
.032 
 
.127 
 
.063 
 
.063 
 
.032 
 
.032 
 
.016  
  
Sample proportion 
 
 
.280 
 
 
.107 
 
.121 
 
.065 
 
.066 
 
.035 
 
.132 
 
.057 
 
.062 
 
.028 
 
.034 
 
.014 
  
Estimated proportion 
 
 
.157 
 
.093 
 
.119 
 
.079 
 
.080 
 
.050 
 
 
.103 
 
.072 
 
.093 
 
.062 
 
 
.055 
  
 
.038 
 
 Estimation prop. – 
Popolation prop. 
 
 
-.10 
 
-.03 
  
 
-.01 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
-.02 
 
.01 
 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
Mean n sampled   
 
 
9.56 
 
3.82 
 
4.28 
 
2.31 
 
 
2.49 
 
1.13 
 
4.64 
 
1.95 
 
2.33 
 
1.03 
 
1.18 
 
0.49 
 
No Ss with n=0 
 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
6 
 
5 
 
11 
 
1 
 
7 
 
7 
 
14 
 
15 
 
24 
 
No Ss with n≤1 
 
 
0 
 
9 
 
2 
 
17 
 
17 
 
29 
 
3 
 
18 
 
20 
 
28 
 
26 
 
35 
 
No Ss with n≤2 
 
 
1 
 
19 
 
11 
 
24 
 
24 
 
35 
 
9 
 
31 
 
24 
 
36 
 
33 
 
39 
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Table 7. Mean Population Inferences (in Percent) By Conditions in Experiment 2 
  
Forward Inferences 
(+1)p(+ / P1) + 0p(+ / P2) + (-1)p(+P3) 
 
 
Backward Inferences 
(+1)p(P1/–) + 0p(P2/–) + (-1)pP3/–)  
 
 
Population 
 
0.00  
 
 
42.86  
 
 
Rating overall 
 
 
6.69 
 
3.46 
 
Forward P1 Focus  
 
 
18.25 
 
 
20.08 
 
 
Forward P3 Focus  
 
 
-1.67 
 
 
-1.67 
 
 
Backward P1 
Focus 
 
 
9.00 
 
 
6.20  
 
 
Backward P3 
Focus 
 
 
-4.13 
 
  
 
-19.13 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Two distinct environments to demonstrate the ultimate sampling dilemma: 
The skewed ecology (A) and the spurious ecology (B). 
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